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          Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities have been common research topics for decades, 
and there are numerous methods being developed to analyze the financial status or predict the 
performance of a company. In this thesis, companies are classified into two groups, as “healthy” 
and “unhealthy” bidders based on the financial leverage ratio and interest coverage ratio. I 
compared the performance of the “healthy” bidders group and the “unhealthy” bidders group 
over both the 60-trading day short and 42-month long term. The empirical results indicate that 
shareholders of “healthy” bidders gain from the takeover decision in general, while the 
shareholders of “unhealthy” bidders lose. In addition, a significant relationship is observed 
between the bidders’ financial health and their announcement abnormal returns, with “healthy” 
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    Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities have been common research topics for decades, 
since the decision of takeover comes with many factors that must be considered. The motives 
behind takeover decisions and performance after the takeover have been among the top two 
topics. The benefits from the takeover for bidders, such as synergies, business expansion, and 
market share increases, have been examined in many papers (e.g. Walker (2000), Healy, Palepu 
and Ruback (1992), Clark and Ofek (1992). etc.). In addition, the outcomes of takeovers, both in 
the short run and the long run, have also been studied (e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), Dutta and 
Jog (2009), etc.). There are many perspectives on the success of a takeover, since a wide range of 
stakeholders are affected by the takeover event and many have unaligned interests. As 
shareholders are the residual owners of the company, gains or losses to shareholders are often 
taken as the main criteria to evaluate post-acquisition performance (Martynova and Renneboog 
(2008)).   
    One interesting question that draws attention is that, despite the various benefits that could be 
achieved by takeover bidders and the common finding that takeover activities create value for 
shareholders, the gains from this decision appear to mostly accrue for the shareholders of target 
companies (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008)). 
It is no wonder why bidders companies’ shareholders, on average, lose, while many companies 
still choose to make the decision to takeover other companies. Based on the consistent finding by 
previous literature that shareholders of takeover bidders do not have significant gains, in this 
paper I place bidder companies into a good group or a bad group based on their financial status 
two years before the takeover announcements.  I then examine whether the outcomes of takeover 
activities for shareholders of bidder companies under various financial situations would also be 
different.   
    I classify companies into the two groups “healthy” bidders and “unhealthy” bidders based on 
the financial leverage ratio and interest coverage ratio two years before the takeover 
announcement date. Public companies that completed deals larger than US$0.2 million from 
1997 to 2010 are considered. I compared the performance of the “healthy” bidders group and the 
“unhealthy” bidders group for both the short and long term. I also examined the relationship 
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between bidders’ financial health status and their post-acquisition performance and control for 
several firm- and deal-related factors. Finally, to reduce the concern of possible size effects, I 
divide the “healthy” bidders group into two subgroups according to their size (their value in 
terms of market capitalization) and compare their respective performance to the “unhealthy” 
bidders group. 
    The empirical results indicate that shareholders of “healthy” bidders gain from the takeover 
decision in general, with their wealth maximized during the one-year period after the 
announcement date. However, even if the market reacts positively to the “unhealthy” bidders’ 
decision to takeover before the announcement date, this decision does not save them from 
trouble, which is consistent with previous literature’s conclusion on shareholders’ losses. In 
addition, a significant relationship is observed between the bidders’ financial health and their 
announcement abnormal returns, with “healthy” bidder shareholders achieving higher abnormal 
returns. For the two financial ratios in the definition of financial health used in this paper, the 
interest coverage ratio is found to be significantly positively related to the announcement 
abnormal returns, while the financial leverage ratio also shows consistently positive but 
insignificant relations. Finally, by looking at the performance of the “unhealthy” bidder group 
and the “healthy” bidder subgroup with comparable sizes, the difference between the abnormal 
returns of the two groups still exists, and the relationship found between financial health and 
post-acquisition performance does not appear to be simply a proxy for a size effect.  
   This paper is organized as follows: firstly, I will review the related literature and develop our 
hypotheses, which is followed by the data and methodologies.  Secondly, results are presented 
and followed by a brief conclusion and discussion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Determining financial status (statistical techniques 𝐯𝐬. ratio analysis) 
    In this paper, I study the results of mergers and acquisition activities initiated by financially 
“healthy” companies and compare their performance to activities initiated by “unhealthy” 
companies. Thus, defining “healthy” becomes a top issue for this study. Over the past several 
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decades, numerous methods have been developed to analyse the financial status or predict the 
performance of a company. Past research has focused on two dimensions: ratio analysis and 
statistical model analysis. Researchers found that financial ratios reveal significant signals about 
a firms’ financial state, starting in the 1930s, for example, Smith and Winakor (1935). Hickman 
(1958) and Beaver (1966) also found companies that experienced difficulties in meeting their 
debt obligations showed suspect ratios compared to companies able to pay their debts easily. 
Today, researchers still consider financial ratios as noteworthy elements to evaluate a company.  
    However, many academics were not satisfied with such isolated information, so they 
developed statistical models to integrate all useful information by taking advantage of statistical 
and programming techniques. For example, Vermeulen, Spronk, and Van der Wijst (1998) 
applied a multi-factor model, based on a series of exogenous risk factors rather than only on 
financial ratios, to model corporate failures. Gupta, Rao and Bagghi (1990) incorporated 
mathematical forecasting methods. In addition, Ohlson (1980) calculated the likelihood of 
distressed firms’ outcomes by applying logistic analysis based on financial ratios.  
    In practice, the Altman Z score is the most widely used measure for financial distress 
identification. To overcome the problem of individual signals in ratio analysis, Altman (1968) 
adopted the technique of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), which uses many ratios at the 
same time. The author developed a discriminant function that allocates different weights to five 
different ratios (working capital/total assets, retained earnings/total assets, EBIT/total assets, 
market value of equity/book value of total debt, and sales/total assets), and transformed these 
individual ratios into a single discriminant score or Z value. For example, Altman and Mcgough 
(1974) used the Altman Z model to evaluate whether a company was likely to remain an ongoing 
concern, in other words, the likelihood of continued operations. Many other studies on financial 
distress also employed this method for different purposes (Pastena and Ruland (1986), Katz, 
Lilien and Nelson (1985), Altman and Brenner (1981), and Haw, Pastena and Liline (1987)). 
Recent studies such as Selvam (2004), Alkhatib and Bzour (2001), and Idoge and Chukwuji 
(2014) found this model still useful for different countries and industries. 
    Another definition that is frequently used to describe a company’s financial situation is the 
financial constraint. Researchers have developed different models to measure the presence and 
degree of a company’s financial constraint. At first, financial constraint is tested by looking at 
4 
 
corporate investment and cash flows (see Fazzari, et al. 1988). Then Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
found evidence to reject the relation between investment-cash flow sensitivities and financing 
constraints, and developed the KZ index
1
, used by many other studies (i.e. Lamont, et al. 2001) 
to determine the financial constraint level. Another two indices, WW index
2
 and SA index
3
, 
developed by Whited and Wu (2006) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), respectively, were also 
developed to measure firms’ financial constraint. Li (2011) used five different measures of 
financial constraints (KZ index, WW index, SA index, age and size) to study the relationship 
between financial constraints and stock returns among R&D-intensive firms. They pointed that 
firms with a higher KZ index, higher WW index, higher SA index, younger age, and smaller size 
are more financially constrained than firms with lower KZ index, lower WW index, lower SA 
index, older age and larger size. 
    The development and application of the Altman Z score model is quite successful in the area 
of identifying and predicting financial status, and financial constraint measures are also effective 
indications of firms’ financial situation. However, in this paper, I choose to use ratio analysis to 
classify my sample. The reason for this is that my focus is on firms’ financial performance rather 
than overall status including operating performance as indicated in Altman Z score model. In 
Asquith, Gerther, Schanfstein (1991)’s study on junk bond issuers, financial distress is defined 
by using only the issuers’ interest coverage ratios because their focus is on firms that get into 
financial distress due to higher leverage rather than relatively poor operating performance. In 
addition, I needed a clear way to identify firms with good financial performance, as well as the 
firms with financial constraints given by those financial constraint indices. As to other models, 
such as multi-factor models and logit analysis mentioned earlier, although they are also found 
quite effective, they are all more focused on predicting a firms’ future performance. As my 
objective is to classify my sample as “healthy” and “unhealthy” during a specific time period, I 
do not need such sophisticated models, and ratio analysis is a simpler and more straightforward 
approach. 
                                                          
1
 The KZ-index is a relative measurement of reliance on external financing. The higher a KZ-index score, the higher    
likelihood of experiencing difficulties when financial conditions tighten. 
2
 WW index uses six different factors created from Compustat data. Firm-level external finance constraints 
represent a source of undiversificable risk that is priced in financial markets. 
3
 SA-index is an index built on firm size and age, which is simpler than KZ-index and WW-index. 
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2.2 Determining financial status (solvency and financial leverage) 
    Firms’ financial status is primarily evaluated through its solvency and leverage. Solvency 
indicates a firm’s capacity to meet its financial commitments; in other words, solvent firms have 
positive net assets and are able to meet current debt obligations. Firms’ financial leverage 
information provides the view about firms’ financing methods and also, to some degree, their 
ability to meet financial obligations. This information is provided by firms’ financial statements 
and quantified by different financial ratios. Among those various ratios, we choose the interest 
coverage and leverage ratios as they provide the most relevant information on firms’ solvency 
and financial leverage. Although there no prior literature provided direct definitions to identify 
financially “healthy” companies according to financial ratios, I can use their rules to guide the 
prediction of financial distress. 
    A firm’s financial leverage ratio (debt/equity or total assets/equity) provide a general picture of 
how it finances or raises funds. The leverage ratio’s importance can be shown by the fact that it 
has been used in so many research topics in the area of M&A. For example, the likelihood of 
becoming an acquisition target is of great interest and usefulness to both investors and policy 
makers, and the financial leverage level is the must-see ratio when modelling takeover 
possibilities. Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) contend that leverage was the only useful aspect in 
explaining the risk of takeover. In addition, lower leverage or less use of debt financing might be 
attractive for targets of firms with high leverage, which was verified by many empirical studies. 
For instance, Palepu (1986) found that targets are characterized by low growth and low leverage. 
Also, in the prediction of turning into financially distressed companies, the financial leverage 
ratio is considered by many authors. For example, both Powell (1997) and Theodossiou, et al. 
(1996) include the leverage in their logit models and find that leverage was an important 
determinant of takeover likelihood.  
    A corporation’s interest coverage ratio is more directly related to its financial health state than 
other ratios. Asquith, Gerther, Schanfstein (1991) used only the interest coverage ratio to define 
financially distressed firms. Goergen and Renneboog (2002) used interest coverage ratio as a 
proxy for potential financial distress. Gay and Nam (1998) found that the lower a firm’s interest 
coverage ratio, the greater its exposure to financial distress.  
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    Moreover, I consider that whether a corporation is “healthy” or not should be a relative 
definition, which is to say, I cannot treat a firm as “healthy” without taking its peer companies in 
the industry into consideration. It is widely known that different industries have different capital 
structures according to their business operation needs, thus “healthy” financial ratios differ across 
industries. When Asquith, Gerther, Schanfstein (1991) studied junk bond issuers, they compared 
sample companies’ interest expense and Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortization (EBITDA) with the median of their industry. Ghosh and Jain (2000) created an 
industry-adjusted sample group in order to compare the financial leverage of the original sample 
with that of matched firms for targets and acquirers from their respective industries. To evaluate 
the financial and operational performance of distressed firms, Abstebro and Winter (2012) 
compared the mean and median of each firm’s ratios to the respective industry’s mean. Thus, due 
to the individual industry’s specific characteristics, I include the industry’s median ratio level in 
the definition of financial health used for this paper. I am confident that combining the financial 
leverage ratio and interest coverage ratio and their levels relative to industry will identify 
financially “healthy” firms in the sample. 
2.3 Post-acquisition performance 
    As the reasons behind takeover activities range from expanding business to achieving 
synergies to being driven by managerial interests, what stakeholders care most about is not the 
merger or acquisitions activities per se, but the results, namely, the performance post acquisition. 
As the interests of different stakeholders, such as shareholders, bondholders, managers and 
employees, are not necessarily aligned, I consider shareholder’s wealth as the primary metric. In 
the extent literature, mergers and acquisitions activities create shareholder value, with most of 
gains accruing for the target shareholders (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)). In this paper, 
I verify this evidence by examining gains to bidders’ shareholders.  
    Both abnormal stock returns immediately surrounding announcement dates and long-term 
movements after the event will be examined in this study. Fama (1969) developed the event 
study methodology to analyse short-term shareholder wealth effects, and this method has been 
the dominant approach since then. According to Martynova and Renneboog (2008)’s summary 
over past takeover waves, bidder shareholders earned abnormal returns statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, and for the most recent merger wave from 1990s, the findings of 17 
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studies were split almost evenly between positive and negative bidders’ announcement abnormal 
returns. Andrade and Mitchell (2001) provided empirical evidence that all these positive and 
negative abnormal returns were not statistically significant.  
    Despite the popularity of the event study method, many problems exist when applying similar 
approaches to long-term studies, in both statistical and financially theoretical aspects. There is no 
consensus on the optimal method to apply for long-term event study. The results from samples in 
different countries and over different observation periods, ranging from one year to five years, 
show inconsistent results (Dutta and Jog (2009), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), Croci (2007), 
and Datta, Datta, and Raman (2001), etc.), with few studies reporting significant positive 
performance for acquirers, and most reporting negative or no abnormal returns (see Agrawal and 
Jaffe (2000) and Martynova and Rennebood (2008)).  
    Thus, this study will make a contribution to the current literature as I examine the takeover 
results using a sample of acquirers separated into financially “healthy” and “unhealthy” 
categories according to their financial leverage and interest coverage ratio two years before the 
announcement. Haw, Pastena and Lilien (1987) divided their acquired-firm sample into three 
groups – “healthy” firms, stable troubled firms, and declining troubled firms – according to the 
Altman Z score, and focused on the performance of each subgroup two months before the event 
date. Therefore, this study differs from both in the definition of financial “healthy” firms and in 
the choice of time periods for performance comparison between the subgroups.  
 
3. HYPOTHESIS 
    As indicated before, my intent is to investigate if a financially “healthy” bidder will achieve 
better post-acquisition performance than a financially “unhealthy” one, both in the short term and 
in the long term. The first objective of this paper is to check if there is an actual difference in the 
abnormal return between “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidders in a [-30, 30] short term and a [-6, 
36]  month-long term event window.  
H10: There is no difference between the abnormal return of “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidders 
over both the [-30, 30] day short-term event window and [-6, 36] month long-term window. 
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H11: “Healthy” bidders have higher abnormal returns than the “unhealthy” ones in both [-30, 
30] day short-term and [-6, 36] month long-term window. 
    Previous research has shown that stock performance after the announcement of acquisitions is 
associated with both the financial leverage ratio (Holland and Hodgkinson (1994)) and interest 
coverage ratio (Asquith, Gerther, Schanfstein (1991)). In this study, I expect to see a positively 
significant correlation between a stock’s abnormal return and the financial health factors in the 
short term. 
H20: No relationship exists between announcement abnormal return and financial health. 
H21: Financial health is related, positively or negatively, to announcement abnormal returns. 
    However, according to the literature I have reviewed, a company’s size has an effect on the 
result. So another task here is to establish that the explanatory power of financial health is not 
simply a proxy for a size effect. 
H30: After controlling the firm size, there is no difference in the announcement abnormal 
returns between “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidders. 
H31: After controlling the firm size, there is a difference in the announcement abnormal returns 
between “healthy” bidders “unhealthy” bidders. 
    If the post-acquisition abnormal return still exists after controlling the size effect, then we can 
reject my third null hypothesis and conclude that the financial health, at least partially, drives the 
difference in stock price performance, between “healthy” bidders and “unhealthy” bidders. 
 
4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
    I started with collecting data from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) US and non-US 
target database. In order to eliminate the interference of very small transactions, I chose deals 
with the minimum value of $0.2 million.  The sample needed to meet the following criteria: 
1. The announcement date was between 01/01/1997 and 31/12/2010. 
2. The acquirer was a publicly traded company listed in either NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMX. 
3. The deal status was completed. 
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    No deals initiated after 31/12/2010 are included as I wanted to study the three-year, post-event 
performance. With the initial sample, I grouped all companies according to their industries, as 
indicated by their two-digit SIC code for a total of 3,354 companies distributed across 58 
industries. I eliminated industries with less than 130 deals during the 13-year sample period (less 
than 10 deals per year) in consideration of the lack of activity. In addition, I removed finance and 
utility companies since the regulatory environment for them is unique. The inclusion of the 
communication industry justifies my choice of sample period starting from 1997 since this 
industry was deregulated through the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Figure 1 shows the 
industry distribution of the final sample. 
Figure 1. Industry Distribution 
 
In order to examine if there will be an effect when bidder and target are in the same 
industry, I also require all my sample transactions to report the target firm’s SIC code 
    Companies must have two years of pre-acquisition data in CRSP and COMPUSTAT in 
order to be included in my sample. As a result, the final sample consists of 2369 firms. 













Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure 





Deals collected from SDC     29015 
Eliminated because of no available data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
two years before the announcement day     23051 
(remaining)     (5964) 
Eliminated because of less than 10 acquisition deals per year in the 
industry     968 
Eliminated firms in the finance and utility Industry     2610 
(remaining)     (2386) 
Eliminated because of no available SIC code for the target companies     17 




    First, we need to identify a company as “healthy” or “unhealthy”. To define a company as 
“healthy”, I compare each firm’s interest coverage ratio and financial leverage ratio to the 
corresponding ratio’s industry median. The interest coverage ratio is defined as a company’s 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by its total interest expense, and is a proxy for 
liquidity. The financial leverage ratio is defined as total debt divided by total equity, and is a 
proxy for solvency. I collect eight quarterly observations for each ratio ending one quarter before 
the announcement date, and then average the eight quarterly ratios into two annual observations 
for both the interest coverage and financial leverage ratios. The criteria to classify the sample 
firms’ financial status is as follows: 
a. If both two annual ratios are higher than the industry median, the company is “healthy”.  
b. If both two annual ratios are lower than the industry median, the company is “unhealthy”. 





Figure 2.Classification of “healthy” and “unhealthy” 
 
Among the total sample, 1472 companies were grouped as financially “healthy” bidders, and 204 
as financially “unhealthy” bidders. The remaining companies that did not satisfy one of the above 
two conditions were not considered separately in this study. 
5.1. Acquiring firms’ short term and long term performance 
    Moving on to examine both short-term and long-term performances of the two subgroups, 
event studies are the most common method of examining short-term return behaviour of firms 
experiencing an event, such as an acquisition. In an efficient capital market, stock prices adjust 
quickly to the public information contained in an acquisition announcement. Thus, the average 
abnormal stock market reaction at announcement is considered a direct measure of shareholders’ 
wealth value changes. For each security 𝑖 with return 𝑅𝑖𝑡 in time period 𝑡 relative to the event, we 
have:  
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐾𝑖𝑡 ; 
Where 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the expected or predicted return given a particular expected return model, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is 
the component of returns, which is abnormal or unexpected. A model of normal returns 
(expected returns unconditional on the event but conditional on other information) must be 
specified before an abnormal return can be determined. 
12 
 
    In this paper, I used the market model to measure the abnormal return. The market model is 
stated as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ; 
    The market model can be seen as a model with 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 constrained to zero and one 
respectively. In terms of market return 𝑅𝑀,𝑡, I used both CRSP equally weighted and value 
weighted market index to measure abnormal returns for robustness. Assuming the announcement 
date as 𝑑 = 0, then the period 𝑑 = −300 to 𝑑 = −46 is taken as an estimation period and the 
method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is adopted for the market model parameter estimation 
procedure. 
    For the short-term event study, daily abnormal returns are collected into cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) to measure the market reaction to the event announcement. The CAR starting at 
time 𝑑1 through time 𝑑2 is defined as: 




    In this paper, I not only observe the immediate reactions effect around the announcement, but 
also capture the wealth changes caused by the event in a longer period, so a few short event 
windows like (𝑑−1, 𝑑1) and (𝑑0, 𝑑1) and two longer event windows  (𝑑−30, 𝑑30) and (𝑑0, 𝑑30) 
are all taken into consideration. Furthermore, when applied to post-event periods, tests using this 
method provide information about market efficiency, since systematically nonzero abnormal 
returns following an event are inconsistent with efficiency and imply a potentially profitable 
trading rule. 
    For the long-term study, the fact that abnormal returns from event studies are imprecise is 
commonly understood, and there is no consensus about the most robust methodologies and 
statistical techniques. In this study, the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) method we use 
has been the commonly applied method to examine the long-term performance of acquiring firms 
since Barber and Lyon (1997). They claim that BHAR is one of the most appropriate methods to 
“precisely measure investor experience.” This methodology attempts to measure the average 
long-term return by buying and holding securities of all companies in the portfolio until the end 
of a pre-specified holding period. The procedure is more realistic in terms of security holders’ 
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real investment experiences, but it also suffers problems just as other methods. For example, the 
buy-and-hold portfolio sets a specific investment period, but different investors prefer different 
rebalancing periods. Since there is no perfect methodology for measuring long-term abnormal 
returns, and we are simply looking for one that provides reliable results, we believe BHAR fits 
our needs in this aspect. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) is calculated by: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 − 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒; 
Where 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 is the holding-period return for the sample, and 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the holding-
period return for the reference portfolio. The reference portfolio is the market return calculated 
by using both CRSP equally weighted and value weighted indices as benchmarks. 
    Furthermore, the choice of window, or holding period for BHAR, is also under debate because 
the best window for us to fully capture the long-term, post-event related effects before these 
effects are compounded by the effects of other events is very hard to determine. Healy and 
Palepu (1995) investigated a case study of CUC International and they found that it took at least 
16 months for the market to be convinced of a higher stock value. The most commonly used 
windows are 36 and 60 months; here I use 36 months in order to include more deals in the 
sample (see Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2002), Andre, Kooli, 
and L’Her (2004) etc.). Thus, the estimation period (-42, -7) months are employed to calculate 
three-year (36-month) BHARs. 
5.2. Firms’ financial status and other characteristics 
    From comparing short-term and long-term performances of firms under different financial 
status, I pieced together a general picture of whether firms with better financial status would 
make the merger or acquisition a better decision. However, I also wanted to measure whether a 
relationship exists between acquiring firms’ financial healthiness and their post-event 
performance through regression analysis.  
    I used the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement date as the proxy for 
firms’ performance. The event window I used is (𝑑0, 𝑑30), which is widely used in past literature, 
to capture the wealth effects brought by the announcement. As to firms’ financial status, I used a 
“healthy” dummy as the main independent variable. If a company is a “healthy” company as 
defined in the methodology, then the health dummy equals 1, and in all other situations equals 0. 
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In addition, I also tested to determine whether one of two ratios in my definition of financial 
health status, interest coverage ratio or financial leverage ratio play a more important role than 
the other in explaining M&A performance. Thus, two additional dummy variables, financial 
leverage dummy and interest coverage dummy, were included in the regression as independent 
variables. The financial leverage dummy equals 1 if a company’s annual leverage ratios in both 
the one year before and the two years before the announcement date were higher than the median 
leverage ratio in its industry, and equals 0 otherwise. The interest coverage dummy applied the 
same criteria. 
    In addition to those main factors in the regression, it was necessary to control for deal- and 
firm-specific characteristics. Two aspects were taken into account in the regression, firm 
characteristics and deal-specific factors, as there was extensive literature indicating a relation 
between the bidder’s abnormal return with firm or deal characteristics (see Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005), Agrawal and Jaffe (2003), Andre, Kooli and L’Her (2004), and 
Dutta and Jog (2009) etc.). As to the firm characteristics, firm size, asset value, equity book-to-
market (BM) ratio, Tobin’s q, and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) were considered.  In 
response to my third hypothesis, I included size in my equation to address the concern of possible 
firm’s size effects on the results. The size variable was calculated as the natural log of firms’ 
market value of equity one quarter before the announcement day. The assets value is the book 
value of a company’s total assets and equity book-to-market (BM) ratio is as defined in Fama 
and French (1992, 1993). Tobin’s q was defined as the book value of assets minus the book value 
of total equity plus the market value of equity, divided by the book value of asset. Finally, firms’ 
WACC during one quarter before announcement day were obtained from Bloomberg. 
    To control for deal-specific characteristics, I used the firm type (public or private), mode of 
acquisition (friendly or hostile), related or unrelated target, payment method, and offer price 
premiums as the control variables. I treated firm type and mode of acquisition as dummy 
variables, with public companies equalling 1 and friendly acquisition attitude equalling 1, and all 
others 0. If bidder and target companies come from the same industry according to their first two-
digit SIC code, I considered the target as related, and the dummy variable equals 1. The 
percentage of cash used in the total transaction payment and the offer price premium over the 
target stock price four weeks prior to the announcement day were taken as the last two variables. 
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These factors were considered since I wanted to explore whether any apparent performance 
differences between financially “healthy” or “unhealthy” firms might be caused by these deal- or 
firm-related factors rather than their financial status, and thus add robustness to my conclusions. 
In addition, throughout this paper, to remove the inflation effects, all the dollar amounts have 
been adjusted by the GDP deflator collected from US Bureau of Economic Analysis, using 2009 
as the base year. 
 
6. RESULTS 
    In this section, I take advantage of firms’ WACC to justify the classification of my sample’s 
financial status, followed by an analysis of post-acquisition abnormal return in both short-term 
and long-term windows. Then, I illustrate the descriptive statistics and regressions on firm- and 
deal-related characteristics. 
6.1 definition of financial status 
    There is no previous literature that uses the same way to define firms as financial “healthy” or 
not as I used in this paper, thus I would like to double check my classification via the financial 
leverage ratio and interest coverage ratio, before I move on to the further study using this 
definition. I used sample firms’ WACCs to check the classification of financially “healthy” and 
“unhealthy” firms since firms’ WACCs also differentiate financially “healthy” firms from 
“unhealthy” ones. The two reasons that I did not use WACC directly as my criteria were that 
financial ratios data were more easily obtainable than WACC, and the cost of debt used in the 
calculation of WACC was an approximation for most firms since the corporate bonds usually do 
not trade in open market.  
    The Modigliani-Miller Proposition II Theory (MM II) defines cost of equity as a linear 
function of the firm's debt-equity ratio. According to them, a company’s WACC rises with its 
financial distress. Hence, I expected the WACC of the “unhealthy” bidder to be higher than the 
WACC of the “healthy” bidder. The rationale is that if “healthy” sample firms’ WACC is lower 
than that of the “unhealthy” sample during period before acquisition for each firm, which means 
“unhealthy” sample firms need to pay a higher rate to raise money in the market, then it justifies 
my classification of the total sample into the “healthy” and “unhealthy” groups. Table 2 shows 
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statistics of WACC one quarter before the announcement day, and we can see the obvious and 
significant differences between the level of WACC for the “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidder 
groups, no matter in mean or median measurement. Also, the minimum WACC for a “healthy” 
bidder of 0.2 occurred in November, 2010, for a company named Realpage Inc. Thus, I am 
confident that my method of grouping “healthy” and “unhealthy” samples is appropriate to help 
continue this study. 
Table 2. WACC One Quarter Before Announcement Day4 
  
Healthy Bidder    
(1) 
Unhealthy Bidder    
(2) 
Total Sample             
(3) 
Difference           
(1) - (2) 
Mean 6.435 11.003 7.438 -4.568*** 
Median 6.3 10.3 6.7 -4*** 
Minimum 0.2 5.7 0.2   
Maximum 12.2 25.8 25.9   
Std. Deviation 1.5293 3.3037 2.7107   
N 784 77 1100 
 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively, using a 
two-tail test. 
 
6.2 Post-acquisition short-term performance 
    For the short-term performance, the first result presented is the comparison of the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) between financially “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidder groups. Figure 3 
shows the equally weighted mean CAR for “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidders and also mean 
CAR for the total sample, which provides a direct impression of how “healthy” and “unhealthy” 
bidders’ stock prices move in a 30-day prior-acquisition period to 30-day post-acquisition period. 
 
                                                          
4
 There is a relationship between my measure of financial leverage ratio (debt/equity) and WACC, however, as this 




Figure 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Day [-30, 30] 
 
    From this figure, the “healthy” bidder group has a higher stock abnormal return than the 
“unhealthy” bidder group all the way from 30 trading days before to 30 trading days after the 
announcement. In the meantime, the total sample’s return pattern is consistent with the literature 
that finds no significant bidders abnormal return. The difference grows starting from one day 
before the event day, and it reaches the highest point at 8.47% at the end of the first month. What 
is interesting here is that the smallest difference on abnormal return between “healthy” and 
“unhealthy” bidder is at the day 𝑑 = −1, when the “unhealthy” bidder has a 2.35% rise from day 
-2 while the “healthy” bidder drops 0.12%. I interpret this phenomenon as the market reacting 
positively to the news that those companies with bad financial status are trying to improve their 
situation by means of acquisitions. Then, the result of the “unhealthy” bidders’ following 
decreases of stock prices provides the point of view that this action cannot save their situation, at 
least not from the shareholder’s perspective. What’s more, the corresponding high trend of 
“healthy” bidders’ stocks helped me reject my first hypothesis in the short run, and showed that 
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firms in a better financial situation make better acquisition choices than financially “unhealthy” 
firms. 
    Table 3 provides numerical results of comparison between two bidder groups in multiple 
short-term event windows from d = −30 to d = 30. When looking at the performance for the 
whole period, “unhealthy” bidders experienced significantly negative CARs (see windows (-30, 
+30) and (+0, +30)), which are highly consistent with the sharp drop after the event as shown in 
figure 3. Lastly, the high significance level of the unhealthy bidder group at least further verifies 
my conclusion that firms with concerns in financial aspects cannot solve their problems using 
takeover activities, or, in other words, financially “unhealthy” firms underperformed after the 
M&A event compared to firms with good financial conditions. 
Table 3. CAR under Different Time Windows during Day [-30, 30] 
  Healthy Bidder Unhealthy Bidder Total Sample 
Time 
Windows 
Mean CAR  
N=1472 
 t value 
Mean CAR  
N=204 
 t value 
Mean CAR  
N=2369 
 t value 
(-30,+30) 3.05% 1.62* -5.44% -1.77* -0.88% -0.89 
(-2,0) 0.42% 2.03** 1.81% 1.782* 0.31% 1.63* 
(0,+1) 0.65% 1.2 1.71% 0.756 0.60% 0.789 
(-1,+1) 1.40% 1.89* 1.03% 1.988** 0.43% 0.032 
(-2,+2) 1.78% 0.94 0.16% 1.354 0.83% 0.125 
(+0,+30) 1.63% 0.54 -1.57% -0.56 -0.50% -0.027 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 level, 
respectively. 
 
    The other interesting result I would like to highlight for the short-window performance is 
regarding changes of firms’ WACCs after the takeover event. I obtained each firm’s WACC one 
year after the announcement date and compared the results to the WACC one quarter before that, 
which I used to justify my classification, and the results are shown in table 4. I recognized that 
the mean or median WACC for each group stayed almost the same from before the event to one 
year after the event. This finding has two implications. The first is that whether “healthy” or not, 
firms’ cost of raising additional capital would not change according to mergers or acquisition 
activities. The other implication, and the more important one, is that, for financially “healthy” 
firms, their shareholders greatly benefit from this decision, while the only explanation for their 
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WACC staying the same would be that the shareholders’ wealth increase comes at the expense of 
the firms’ debt holders. Thus, one concern is whether these financially “healthy” firms will stay 
“healthy” in the long run, after this zero-sum game. 
Table 4. Comparison of WACC One Quarter Before and One Year after the 
Announcement Day 
























after              
(6) (6)-(5) 
Mean 6.44 6.62 0.18** 11.01 11.09 0.08 7.44 7.55 0.11* 
Median 6.3 6.5 0.2 10.3 11.2 0.9 6.7 7.1 0.4 
Minimum 0.2 0.6 0.4 5.7 4.5 -1.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 
Maximum 12.2 13 0.8 25.8 20.4 -5.4 25.9 25.9 0 
Std. 
Deviation 1.53 1.91 0.38 3.30 2.71 -0.59 2.71 2.81 0.10 
N 784 784   77 77   1100 1100   
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 level, respectively,  
using a two-tail test.                 
 
6.3 Post-acquisition long-term performance 
    Figure 4 shows the results of buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for a 6-month prior- and 
36-month post-acquisition period, and table 5 presents six different windows during this period. 
From figure 4, the performance for both “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidder groups during this 
whole period can be divided into three parts. The first part is from the beginning of this period 
until around the announcement date, and the second part is the following 18 months, followed by 
the last few months. In terms of healthy bidder groups, the sample companies show a 
significantly positive reaction to the takeover before the announcement date (see windows (-6, 
+0) and (-1, +1) in table 5). Then, the stock price rises to a large extent during the following year 
and half after the event, with the highest BHAR reaching 22.87%. In the last period, I consider 
that their reactions to the event have been totally digested, and the stock prices go back to the 
normal level. Their performances are still higher than the level before the event but 
insignificantly lower than that of the announcement date (see windows (-6, +36) and (+0, +36) in 
20 
 
table 5). Thus, from this long-term window, I take the opinion that takeover actions will do better 
for shareholders in the long run, with their wealth maximized during the year following the 
announcement. 
 
Figure 4. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return in Month [-6, 36] 
 
    If we take the performance of “healthy” bidders as a benchmark during the three periods we 
have summarized, the “unhealthy” bidders group’s performance also gives us many hints. During 
the first period, we can see “unhealthy” bidders showed significant declines especially during the 
first month after the announcement (see windows (-6, +0) and (-1, +1) in table 5), which is quite 
consistent with the short-term results shown before. When “healthy” bidders’ shareholders enjoy 
their terrific time of gaining wealth, “unhealthy” bidders’ stocks keep slightly dropping down 
after the shock of the takeover announcement (see window (0, +18) in table 5). The difference 
between BHAR of the two bidders groups was the largest at 18.37%. Later, when the market 
returns to normal, “unhealthy” firms started to present large volatilities from the 18th month. This 
was also the case for “healthy” bidders. What is understood from this situation as that after the 
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market absorbs all the information during the one-year period, some of the companies under 
worse financial status are able to save their situation through the takeover decision, while others 
are not, and the performance differences lead to the high volatility and shareholder losses 
averagely in the long run (see windows (-6, 36) and (+0, +36) in table 5) for those financially 
“unhealthy” groups. Finally, I can reject the first hypothesis also in the long run as performance 
after takeovers are better for “healthy” bidders than “unhealthy” ones both in the short-term and 
long-term periods. 
    One thing that draws my attention is the extremely high market reactions for financially 
healthy bidders during the first year. It is rare to see such highly positively market reactions, 
however, the rise only lasts around one year, followed by a sharp drop until 5% during the next 
half year. According to Healy and Palepu (1995), market needs at least 16 months to be 
convinced of a higher stock value, and here the extremely high value is obviously not permanent. 
I consider there is a possibility that these extremely high values are driven by some extreme 
values since the sample period covers both the internet bubble and financial credit crisis periods. 
In addition, the BHAR of the total sample behaves very normal and is highly consistent with 
earlier literature, which makes the results of two comparison groups more persuasive. 
Table 5 displays six different windows from 6 months before to 36 months after the 
announcement date. 
Table 5. BHAR under Different Time Windows during Month [-6, 36] 
  Healthy Bidder Unhealthy Bidder Total Sample 
Time 
Windows 
Mean BHAR  
N=1472 
 t value 
Mean BHAR 
N=204 
 t value 
Mean BHAR  
N=2369 
 t value 
(-6,+36) 5.37% 1.7* -5.33% -0.44 1.02% 0.54 
(-6,0) 2.25% 2.01** -5.89% -0.29 3.35% 1.46 
(0,+18) 0.94% 0.97 -0.51% -0.563 1.23% 0.773 
(+19,+36) 3.90% 1.117 -8.69% -0.88 -3.24% -0.83 
(-1,+1) 1.07% 1.767* -6.03% -1.579* 0.73% 1.91* 
(+0,+36) 0.80% 0.25 -4.43% -0.713 -4.24% -1.002 




6.4 Regression analysis                                  
In order to check the relationship between financial status and abnormal returns, I use the 
regression technique with firm- and deal-related factors as control variables. Table 6 showed the 
statistics of bidder characteristics in the aspect of firms and deals in panel A and panel B, 
respectively, including financially “healthy,” “unhealthy” and total sample bidder groups, 
followed by the regression result in table 7.  
    From the transaction values in panel A, I found a large difference between the two bidder 
groups with $789 million compared to $86 million. However, when I took the bidders’ market 
value of equity and assets’ book value into consideration, as shown in the TV/Equity and 
TV/Asset ratio, their levels are much more similar. It is quite reasonable that large firms make 
big transactions. In terms of payment method through cash or equity, financially “healthy” 
bidders prefer to pay through cash, while “unhealthy” bidders are more willing to pay with their 
equities, which confirmed my earlier opinion that equities of financially “unhealthy” bidders are 
generally overvalued. In addition, the “unhealthy” bidders show a lower percentage of making 
acquisitions in the same industry and their high percentage level for both public and private 
target give us the idea that the “unhealthy” firms are eager to take acquisition actions so that they 
do not have too much preference for either targets from the same industry or public/private 
targets as other “healthy” companies do. Their higher likelihood to make a tender offer or a 
hostile offer provides us a similar impression. 
    From panel B in table 6, the first interesting observation is that both the asset value and market 
capitalization of financially “healthy” bidders, which can be proxies for firms’ sizes, are more 
than 10 times larger than those of “unhealthy” bidders. I understand the reason for this as being 
the large difference between the sample number of these two groups (1472 for the financially 
“healthy” bidder group and 204 for the “unhealthy” bidder group). Then, the debt/asset ratio and 
leverage ratio also present a consistent result that the financial leverage level for “healthy” 
bidders was higher than “unhealthy” ones for around 30%. Additionally, Tobin’s q and BM 
ratios (see Done, Conrad, and Dittmar (2003) and Fama and French (1995)) are frequently used 
as the criteria of justifying over- or under-valuation. These two ratios give the same impression 
that “unhealthy” bidders are generally overvalued, compared to “healthy” bidders. 
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Table 6. Firm and Deal Characteristics 
Column (1), column (3) and column (5) present the mean of each characteristics of the healthy bidder, the unhealthy 
bidder and the total sample respectively. Column (2), column (4) and column (6) present the median value of each 
characteristic of the firm types. All the data are collected one quarter before the event to avoid the influence of the 
announcement. Market capitalization ($ million) is calculated by multiplying the shares outstanding and the closing 
price on that day. Leverage ratio is defined as debt divided by equity book value. Tobin's q is defined as the book value 
of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets. Book-to-
market (BM) is defined as the ratio of the book value of a firm's common stock to its market value. [see Fama and 
French (1993)]. The transaction value is the total value of consideration paid by the acquiror, excluding fees and 
expenses, collected from SDC. Cash and equity in the consideration paid is also from SDC. Same industry deals involve 
targets with the first 2-digit Sic codeidentical to the one of the bidder. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively, using a heteroscedastic one-tail test. 
Panel A. Deal Characteristics 
  
Healthy Bidder Unhealthy Bidder Total Sample Differences    
  
Mean            
(1) 
Median        
(2) 
Mean            
(3) 
Median         
(4) 
Mean            
(5) 
Median        
(6) (1) - (3) 
Transaction Value 789.35 81.09 85.97 19.98 495.71 51.05 703.38*** 
TV/Equity (market) 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.0353 0.01 
TV/Assets (book) 0.16 0.05 0.25 0.09 0.18 0.0454 -0.09 
Cash in payment (%) 51.02   38.99   44.20   12.03 
Equity in payment (%) 9.91   26.75   12.40   -16.84 
Pure cash deal (%) 42.10   22.41   31.30   19.69 
Pure equity deal (%) 5.05   15.63   8.65   -10.58 
Tender-offer (%) 2.01   3.56   3.01   -1.55 
Hostile deal (%) 0.00   1.47   0.17   -1.47 
Same industry (%) 68.44   62.42   63.89   6.02 
Public target (%) 14.23   19.53   16.15   -5.30 
Private target (%) 38.87   55.78   44.93   -16.91 
Subsidiary target (%) 44.96   23.24   37.54   21.72 
N 1472 1472 204 204 2369 2369   







Table 6 - Continued 
Panel B. Bidder Characteristics 
  
Healthy Bidder Unhealthy Bidder Total Sample Differences    
  
Mean            
(1) 
Median        
(2) 
Mean            
(3) 
Median         
(4) 
Mean            
(5) 
Median        
(6) (1) - (3) 
Asset (book) 15,729.89 2,456.62 1,221.39 173.50 9,987.45 1,234.69 14508.50*** 
Market capitalization 14,958.32 2,933.58 1,384.95 432.57 10,753.06 1,477.68 13573.37*** 
Debt/asset (book) 0.42 0.48 0.19 0.18 0.36 0.44 0.23** 
Leverage Ratio 1.35 0.40 0.96 0.10 1.24 0.33 0.39** 
Tobin's q 2.21 1.77 3.47 2.24 2.64 1.78 -1.26*** 
BM (equity) 0.87 0.43 0.47 0.27 0.58 0.40 0.4** 
N 1472 1472 204 204 2369 2369   
 
     
  I first conducted the regressions with only firms and deal-related factors as independent 
variables, as shown in table 7 from model 1 and model 2. In order to observe the impact of a 
firm’s financial status, I run the regressions with the “healthy” dummy and two ratio dummies 
and with other factors as control variables, and the results are shown in table 7 from model 3 to 
model 6. The last two regression models were to include offer premiums, which I will explain 
later. The regression covered the whole sample period from 1997 to 2010, and the dependent 






Table 7. Multivariate OLS regression analysis of                                                                                        
CAR under Day [0, 30] 
The dependent variable is the CAR for period [0, 30]. Health dummy equals 1 if the acquiror is healthy, otherwise 0. 
Leverage ratio dummy equals 1 if both years leverage are higher than the industry median, and equals 0 otherwise. 
It is the same for interest coverage dummy. Same industry dummy equals 1 if both target and bidder are in the 
same industry as indicated by the 2-digit SIC code. Size is the natural log of firms' market capitalization one quarter 
before the announcement day. Assets value is the natural log of asset book value. Attitude equals 1 if it is a friendly 
deal, otherwise equals 0. Cash in payment is the percentage of cash in the total deal payment. Tobin's q is the book 
value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets. 
Book-to-market (BM) is the ratio of the book value of a firm's common stock to its market value. [see Fama and 
French (1993)]. WACC is obtained from Bloomberg for each firm one quarter before the announcement day. 
Premium is the percentage of offer price over the target stock price. Premium data are available only for public 
targe four weeks before the announcement day. For each variable I list the coefficient and the p-value (in 
parentheses). N is the number of observations. Respectively, the symbol *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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-0.005   
(0.083)** 
            
Adjusted R-
Square 
0.038 0.038 0.0454 0.046 0.0514 0.038 0.032 0.036 
N 1065 1065 1297 1297 1297 1297 141 141 
 
        When I considered only firms and deal-related factors through models 1 and 2, all factors 
were significant except for the target choices of the same industry, public or private or other. In 
model 1, the significantly negative relationship between WACC and abnormal returns revealed 
again that firms with a high cost of capital cannot achieve high abnormal returns in response to 
the takeover announcement. Then I included the healthy dummy into the regression in models 3 
and 4 and both revealed significantly positive effects of firms’ financial health on abnormal 
returns. Thus, I could reject my second hypothesis and conclude that firms’ financial health does 
have significantly positive effects on its performance after the acquisition announcement. 
        Then, I wanted to check which ratio plays relatively more roles in determining firms’ post-
acquisition performance, so I conducted the regression models 5 and 6. I discovered the 
significantly positive impact of interest coverage ratio on bidders’ performance during the first 
month after announcement. The higher the bidders’ interest coverage ratio, the better their 
solvent abilities, and the more positive the reaction of the market was to their takeover decisions. 
The leverage ratio was not significant in the statistical level, but I still saw the consistent positive 
relation between the leverage level and their post-event performance no matter what factors I 
controlled in the model. Taking the whole regression result table into consideration, I realized 
that whether targets were in the same industry and whether they were public, private or even 
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subsidiaries did not matter considering the post-acquisition performance. Furthermore, bidders’ 
attitude on the acquisition became less important after taking financial health factors into 
account. However, the Tobin’s q and BM ratios keep their significance level no matter what, and 
this is under expectation because for both financially “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidders, if their 
equities are overvalued, the market will definitely not react positively to their decision of making 
mergers or acquisitions.  
    For regression models 7 and 8, I wanted to examine whether offer premiums have any effects 
on post-event performance. Since offer premium data is only available for public companies, the 
sample data in models 7 and 8 was restricted to the 196 deals within the total sample. I did not 
see significantly important influence of offer premiums on firms’ abnormal returns, and the 
significance of other factors also disappeared in these two models. This phenomenon can be 
explained either by the small sample size or the unimportance of the target’s public status on the 
takeover activities. 
    Moreover, I was not surprised that in models 1 to 2, firms’ sizes displayed significantly 
positive effects on the abnormal returns. This lead me to consider whether my results of post-
event significant abnormal returns were the proxy of small firms’ size effects, thus I included 
also sizes in my regression models 3 through 8. The simultaneous significance level of financial 
health status and the size factors eased my concern of size effects. While, in order to further 
confirm my conclusion, I conducted detailed research, reflected by statistics in table 8 and 










Table 8. Firm and Deal Characteristics for Healthy Bidder Subgroups 
The classification of large and small is based on the mean market capitalization of unhealthy bidder. The 
smaller 865 healthy bidders that have a mean market capitalization of 1,387.64, which is comparable to the 
mean market capitalization of unhealthy bidders of 1,384.95, are grouped into one subsample called small 
healthy bidder, while the rest are grouped into the large healthy bidder subsample. Column (1) presents the 
mean value of each characteristic for large healthy bidder, column (2) presents the small healthy bidder, and 
column (3) presents the whole unhealthy bidder group for compare. All the data are collected one quarter 
before the event to avoid the influence of the announcement. Market capitalization ($ million) is calculated 
by multiplying the shares outstanding and the closing price on that day. Leverage ratio is debt divided by 
equity book value. Tobin's q is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity, divided by the book value of assets. Book-to-market (BM) is the ratio of the book value of a firm's 
common stock to its market value. [see Fama and French (1993)]. The transcation value is the total value of 
consideration paid by the acquiror, excluding fees and expenses, collected from SDC. Cash and equity in the 
consideration paid is also from SDC. Same industry deals involve targets with the first 2-digit Sic codeidentical 
to the one of the bidder. The symblos *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
level, respectively. 











  (1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3) 
Transaction Value 1457.88 135.21 85.97 1,322.67*** 1,371.91*** 49.24 
TV/Equity (market) 0.061 0.1874 0.14       
TV/Assets (book) 0.1267 0.2360 0.25       
Cash in payment (%) 48.15 53.3 38.99 -5.15 9.16 14.31 
Equity in payment (%) 12.58 10.41 26.75 2.17 -14.17 -16.34 
Pure cash deal (%) 33.6 45.72 22.41 -12.12 11.19 23.31 
Pure equity deal (%) 6.81 4.7 15.63 2.11 -8.82 -10.93 
Tender-offer (%) 1.32 2.98 3.56       
Hostile deal (%) 0 0 1.47       
Same industry 63.25 70.53 62.42       
Public target (%) 28.32 10.09 19.53       
Private target (%) 27.08 49.56 55.78       
Subsidiary target (%) 43.01 38.64 23.24       
N 607 865 204       
          (continued) 
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Table 8 - Continued 











  (1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2)- (3) 
Asset (book) 38,952.47 1,401.69 1,221.39 37,550.78*** 37,731.08*** 180.30 
Market 
capitalization 
36,597.51 1,387.64 1,384.95 35,209.87*** 35,212.56*** 2.69 
Debt/asset (book) 0.5521 0.3002 0.19 0.2519** 0.3621* 0.11 
Leverage Ratio 0.57 1.57 0.96 -1** -0.39* 0.61 
Tobin's q 1.42 2.71 3.47 -1.29* -2.05 -0.76 
BM (equity) 1.08 0.69 0.47 0.39** 0.61 0.22 
N 607 865 204       
 
 
    I divided the “healthy” bidders into two subgroups using the cut point of “unhealthy” bidders’ 
mean market capitalization. The 865 “healthy” bidders that have a mean market capitalization of 
$1,387.64 million, which is similar to the mean market capitalization of “unhealthy” bidders of 
1,384.95 million, are grouped into one subsample called small “healthy” bidders group, while the 
rest are the large “healthy” bidders group. In table 8, the small “healthy” bidders group has an 
asset book value of 1,401.69 million, and their leverage ratio, Tobin’s q, the book-to-market ratio 
are all at comparable levels with the “unhealthy” bidders group. The rationale here is that if the 
abnormal return for the small “healthy” bidders group is also similar to the “unhealthy” bidder 
group, then the health effect is only a proxy for the size. Figure 5 shows the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for total “healthy” bidders, large “healthy” bidders, small “healthy” bidders and the 
“unhealthy” bidders in a [-30, 30] event period. It shows clearly that both the large and small 
“healthy” bidders have a similar trend as the total “healthy” bidders, which follows an opposite 
trend than the “unhealthy” bidders. Therefore, after controlling the firm size, difference still 
exists between the “healthy” and “unhealthy” bidders. I can reject my last hypothesis with 
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confidence and conclude that size does not affect my earlier observation on the relationship 
between financial health status and their post-acquisition performance. 
 





    Financial academics seem to have the consensus standpoint that takeovers create value for 
shareholders in a general level, with most gains to target shareholders. That is to say, 
shareholders of takeover bidders usually lose. However, if bidders are separated into different 
groups according to their financial status two years before the takeover announcement, will the 
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The criteria to classify bidders into financially “healthy” and “unhealthy” groups is based on 
each company’s financial leverage and interest coverage ratio, and their comparison with each 
ratio’s median within the same industry. I did not choose complex statistical models or 
programming to classify the health status in consideration of the simplicity of financial ratios, 
and I also did not use the Altman Z score model since I focused exclusively on firms’ financial 
performance rather than overall performance, including operating performance. My sample 
consists of 1,472 “healthy” and 204 “unhealthy” bidders. 
    In the short term, the “healthy” bidder’s stock reacts positively to the announcement of 
takeover from 30 trading days before (due to rumours and inside information) to 30 trading days 
after the announcement. However, the reaction of “unhealthy” bidders’ stocks is significantly 
positive at one day before the announcement, followed by the continuous decline from the 
announcement date. Thus, “unhealthy” bidders’ decision to takeover cannot save them from 
trouble in financial aspects from the shareholder’s standpoint. In the long run, “healthy” bidders’ 
stock show higher levels three years after compared to one month before the announcement date, 
with shareholder’s wealth maximized during the one year following the announcement. As to 
“unhealthy” bidders, the stocks keep falling in the 36 months after with large volatilities. Overall, 
financially “healthy” bidders do make better takeover decisions than “unhealthy” bidders for 
shareholders in both the short term and long term. 
    In addition, I also confirmed that there is a significantly positive relationship between a firm’s 
financial health status and its post-announcement performance through regression analysis. I 
discovered that interest coverage ratios link positively to the post-event performance, and 
financial leverage ratio does not show significance in the positive relation. With many firms and 
deal-related factors, I had some other observations. For example, “unhealthy” bidders are usually 
overvalued according to their Tobin’s q and BM ratios and also their high willingness to pay with 
equities rather than cash. I also found no evidence that targets’ industry, targets’ type (private or 
public), and offer price premiums relate to post-announcement abnormal returns. In order to 
exclude the possibility of size effects, I divided the “healthy” bidders group into a large and a 
small subgroup, with the small subgroup with comparable market capitalization as “unhealthy” 
bidders. I then compared the post-acquisition performance of the two subgroups and the 
“unhealthy” bidder groups and found that even the small subgroup of ”healthy” bidders still 
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presented much higher abnormal returns than “unhealthy” bidders. Therefore, my results 
showing a significant relationship between a firm’s financial health and post-acquisition 
performance is not a proxy for the size. 
    Another interesting result here is that I found that all sample bidders’ WACC stay at the same 
level one year after the announcement as they were one fiscal quarter before the announcement. I 
cannot help thinking that for financially “healthy” bidders, with the WACC unchanged, the 
benefits for shareholders from the takeover actually come at the expense of firms’ debt holders. 
In this case, whether these financially “healthy” bidders could stay healthy in the long term is 







Agrawal, and F. Jaffe, 2003, Do takeover targets underperform? Evidence from operating and 
stock     returns, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38: 721 -746. 
Agrawal, and F. Jaffe, J.F., 2000, The post-merger performance puzzle. Advance in mergers and      
acquisitions 1, 7 -41 
Almeida, H., & Campello, M. (2007). Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and corporate 
investment. Review of Financial Studies, 20(5), 1429-1460. 
Andre, P., Kooli, M., L’Her, J., 2004, The long-run performance of mergers and acquisitions: 
evidence from the Canadian stock market, Financial Management, Winter, 27 -43. 
Asquith, P., 1983, Merger bids, uncertainty and stockholder returns, Journal of Financial 
Economics 11, 51 -83. 
Asquith, Paul, Robert F. Bruner, and David W. Mullins, 1983, The gains to bidding firms from 
merger, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 121 -139. 
Barber, B.M., Lyon, J.D., 1997, Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power 
and          specification of test statistics, Journal of Financial Economics 43, 341 -372. 
Barber, W., Lehavy, R., McNichols, M., Trueman, B., 2001, Can investors profit from prophets? 
Security analyst recommendations and stock returns, The Journal of Finance 56, 531 -568. 
Ben-Amar, and Andre, 2006, Separation of ownership from control and acquiring firm 
performance: The case of family ownership in Canada, Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 33, 517 -543. 
Bradley, Michael D., Anand S. Desai, and E. Han Kim, 1988, Synergistic gains from corporate 
acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms, 
Journal of Financial Economics 21, 3 -40. 
Brav, A., 2000, Inference in long-horizon event studies: A Bayesian approach with application to 
initial public offerings, The Journal of Finance 55, 1979 -2016. 
Brown, S.J., Warner, J.B., 1985, Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies, Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 3 -31. 
Eckbo, B.E., Maksimovic, Y., Williams, J., 1991, Consistent estimation of cross-sectional 
models in event studies, Review of Financial Studies 3, 343 -365. 
Eckbo, B.E., Thorburn, K.S., 2000, Gains to bidders firms revisited: Domestic and foreign 
acquisitions in Canada, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 1 -25. 
Erik M. Vermeulen, Jaap Spronk, Nico van der Wijst, 1998, The application of the multi-factor 
model in the analysis of corporate failure, Operational Tools in the Management of Financial 
Risks, 59 -73. 
34 
 
Fama, E.F., 1998, Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance, Journal of 
Financial Economics 49, 283 -306. 
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, Journal 
of Financial Economics 43, 153 -193. 
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1995, Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns, The 
Journal of Finance 50, 131 -155. 
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and 
Economics October, 301 -326. 
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. G., & Petersen, B. C. (1988). Financing constraints and corporate 
investment. 
Franks, J., Jarris, R., Titman, S., 1991, The postmerger share-price performance of acquiring 
firms, Journal of Financial Economics 29, 81 -96. 
Fuller, K., Netter, J., Stegemoller, M., 2002, What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? Evidence 
from firms that make many acquirtions, The Journal of Finance 57, 1763 -1793. 
Ghosh, A., 2001, Does operating performance really improve following corporate acquisitions? 
Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 151 -178. 
Gregory, A., 1997, An examination of the long-run performance of UK acquiring firms, Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting 24, 971 -1002. 
Hadlock, C. J., & Pierce, J. R. (2010). New evidence on measuring financial constraints: Moving 
beyond the KZ index. Review of Financial studies, 23(5), 1909-1940. 
Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G., Ruback, R.S., 1992, Does corporate performance improve after 
mergers? Journal of Financial Economics 31, 135 -175. 
Kaplan, S. N., & Zingales, L. (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 169-215. 
Kaplan, S. N., & Zingales, L. (2000). Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures of 
financing constraints (No. w7659). National bureau of economic research. 
La Cava, G., Richards, T., Shuetrim, G., & Vickery, J. (2005). Financial Constraints, the User 
Cost of Capital and Corporate Investment in Australia. Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Lamont, O., Polk, C., & Saa-Requejo, J. (2001). Financial constraints and stock returns. Review 
of financial studies, 14(2), 529-554. 
Lang, and K. Martin, 1992, Postacquisition performance of acquiring firms, Financial 
Management 21, 69 -79. 
Lang, Larrh H.P., Rene M. Stulz, and Ralph A. Walking, 1989, Managerial performance, Tobin’s 
q, and the gains from successful tender offers, Journal of Financial Economics 24, 137 -154. 
35 
 
Li, D. (2011). Financial constraints, R&D investment, and stock returns. Review of Financial 
Studies, hhr043. 
Limmack, R.J., 1991, Corporate mergers and shareholder wealth effects: 1977 -1986, Accounting 
and Business Research 21, 239 -251. 
Livdan, D., Sapriza, H., & Zhang, L. (2009). Financially constrained stock returns. The Journal 
of Finance, 64(4), 1827-1862. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J., 2000, Uniformly least powerful tests of market efficiency, Journal of 
Financial Economics 55, 361 -390. 
Lyon, J.D., Barber, B.M., Tsai, C., 1999, Improved methods for tests of long-run abnormal stock 
returns, The Journal of Finance 54, 165 -201. 
Martynova, M., Renneboog, L., 2008, A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned 
and where do we stand? Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 2148 -2177. 
Megginson, W.L., Morgan, A., Nail, L., 2004, The determinants of positive long-term 
performance in strategic mergers: Corporate focus and cash, Journal of Banking and Finance 
28, 523 -525. 
Mitchell, M.L., Stafford, E., 2000, Managerial decisions and long-term stock price performance, 
Journal of Business 73, 287 -329. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1988, Management ownership and market valuation: An 
empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293 -315. 
R. F. Smith and A. H. Winakor, Changes in the Financial Structure of Unsuccessful 
Corporations, University of Illinois: Bureau of Business Research 1935. 
Rau, P.R., Vermaelen, T., 1998, Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of 
acquiring firms, Journal of F inancial Economics 49, 223 -253. 
S. B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, and Rene M. Stulz, 2004, Firm size and the gains from 
acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201 -228. 
S. B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, and Rene M. Stulz, 2005, Wealth destruction on a 
massive scale? A study of acquiring-firm returns in the recent merger wave, Journal of 
Finance 60, 757 -787. 
Schwert, G. William, 2000, Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholders? The Journal of 
Finance 55, 2599 -2640. 
Selvam, M., Vanitha, S., & Babu, M, 2004, A Study on Financial Health of Cement Industry-Z 
Score analysis, The Management Accountant 39, 591-593. 




Shantanu Dutta, and Vijay Jog, 2009, The long-term performance of acquiring firms: A re-
examination of       an anomaly, Journal of Banking & Finance 33, 1400 -1412. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political 
Economy 95, 461 -488. 
Whited, T. M., & Wu, G. (2006). Financial constraints risk. Review of Financial Studies, 19(2), 
531-559. 
Y.P. Gupta, R.P. Rao, P.K. Bagghi, 1990, Linear goal programming as an alternative to 
multivariate discriminant analysis: a note, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 17, 
593–598. 
Yuce, A., Ng, A., 2005, Effects of private and public Canadian merger, Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Sciences 22, 111 -124. 
 
 
